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According to St. Thomas, the natures of material things are the proper
objects of human understanding.1 And he holds that, at least in this life,
humans cognize these natures, not through innate species or by perceiving
the divine exemplars, but only by abstraction from phantasms (ST Ia, 84.7,
85.1).2 More precisely, the human intellect’s active component, the agent
intellect, produces cognition of the natures of material things by abstracting
intelligible forms from phantasms and informing them on its passive com-
ponent, the possible intellect, to actualize the latter’s potency to under-
stand.3 The aim of the present piece is to clarify Thomas’s account of this
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mentary on the De Anima, and to Torin Alter for extensive written comments on an
earlier draft. I would like to thank Eleonore Stump for her many generous com-
ments and suggestions, and Robert Pasnau, not only for his helpful criticisms of the
penultimate draft, but also for graciously providing me related chapters from his
current work on St. Thomas. Thanks also to John Carriero and Marleen Rozemond
for helpful discussions. Finally, I am grateful to the University of Arizona, both the
Department of Philosophy and the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences, for
a Junior Sabbatical that supported work on this article.
1. Thomas claims only that the natures of things are the proper objects of the
intellect, not that they are its only objects: he does not deny that we have intellective
cognition also of the contingent states and situations of particular material things.
2. This claim applies to the exercising of concepts already acquired, as well as
their initial acquisition (ST Ia 84.7). Here and throughout, I use “cognition” to
translate “cognitio.” As Scott MacDonald (“Theory of Knowledge” in Cambridge
Companion to Aquinas, ed., N. Kretzmann and E. Stump [Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993], p. 162) points out, translating “cognitio” with “knowledge”
is misleading, given that cognitiones can, on Thomas’s account, be false (see, for
example, ST Ia 17.3). I discuss Aquinas’s conception of cognition in section I.1.
3. This division of the intellect into an active and a passive component origi-
nates in Aristotle’s cryptic remark that in the soul “there is a mind for becoming all
things” and “a mind for producing all things” (DA III 5, 430a10). This passage has
been subject to myriad interpretations. Aristotle’s Arabic commentators read him
as saying that (one or both) of these intellects are single and separate from
individual human souls. In opposition to these interpretations, Aquinas holds that
the agent and possible intellects are both immanent powers of each individual soul.
85
Medieval Philosophy and Theology 10 (2001), 85–118. Printed in the United States of America.
Copyright © 2001 Cambridge University Press 1057-0608
DOI: 10.1017.S1057060801010052
intellective abstraction, and thereby the precise force of the conceptual
empiricism it asserts.4 Examining his distinction between sensible and intel-
lectual cognition, and his account of the way the former, in phantasms,
supplies the data for intellective abstraction, will lead us to reassess the
nature of Thomas’s antinativism—arguably the most important historical
and philosophical legacy of his cognitive psychology.
In advancing this account, Thomas is insisting that we derive our
Since these interpretations enjoyed considerable popularity in Aquinas’s day, we
often find him developing his account of the human intellect in explicit opposition
to them (cf. OUIAA).
4. Important recent work by several scholars has advanced our understanding
of many central aspects of Aquinas’s philosophy of mind and epistemology, includ-
ing his account of intellective abstraction. See Eleonore Stump, “Aquinas on the
Foundations of Knowledge,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Supplementary Vol-
ume) 17 (1992); “Aquinas’s Account of the Mechanisms of Intellective Cognition,”
Revenue Internationale de Philosophie 52 (1998): 287–307; “Aquinas on Sensory Cog-
nition,” in Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition, eds. Sten Ebbesen and
Russell L. Friedman, volume 77 in the series Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes
Selskab, Historisk-Filosofiske Meddelelser (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1999), pp.
377–395. Norman Kretzmann, “Infallibility, Error, and Ignorance,” Canadian Jour-
nal of Philosophy 17 (1992); Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” in Cambridge Compan-
ion to Aquinas; Robert Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Scott MacDonald (“Theory of
Knowledge,” in Cambridge Companion to Aquinas).
Many of these discussions share a salutary focus on Aquinas’s claims regarding
the reliability of our faculties, so that their treatments of intellective abstraction tend
to center on his prima faciae wildly implausible claim to its infallibility: “The proper ob-
ject of intellect is the quiddity of a thing, and this is why intellect is not fallible regard-
ing the quiddity of a thing, speaking of it just as such” (ST Ia 85.6). Kretzmann
provides an interesting and detailed treatment of this claim. Drawing on a range of
texts, he argues that the intellect’s apprehension of the quiddity of a thing is such that
one acquires an initial, crude concept of that thing, and that this apprehension must
be distinguished from the intellect’s act of compounding, in judgments, the aspects
of things so apprehended: it is only through a fallible, and extended process of mak-
ing such judgments that we arrive at more adequate concepts of things (see the final
section of “Infallibility, Error, and Ignorance”). MacDonald also makes insightful,
and complementary, observations along similar lines (pp. 183–84). However, though
helpful, these points do not suffice to explain, let alone render defensible, Thomas’s
claim of infallibility: why can’t some of our acts of intellective abstraction yield false
cognitions (however rudimentary), in the sense Thomas specifies?; in other words;
why can’t the agent intellect sometimes produce in the possible intellect forms which
do not correspond to the forms that actually inhere, or even could inhere, in material
things? I think that Stump is right to take this optimism to be one striking instance of
Thomas’s general epistemic optimism rooted in his conviction that God designed
our cognitive faculties (Stump, “Foundations of Knowledge,” pp. 145–48).
The interpretation of his intellective abstraction provided here complements
Stump’s insight. For it, in effect, elaborates how Aquinas’s theistic metaphysics
grounds his epistemic optimism about the first operation of our intellect. In par-
ticular, it explains how the agent intellect, as the human participating likeness in
the divine light of understanding, has the active potency to order phantasms in such
a way that it can produce in the possible intellect intelligible species which are
determinate likenesses of the particular material things of which we have experi-
ence (cf. Section III iv, below).
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concepts of material things from our sensible cognition of those things.5
But it is far from clear just how our senses supply this cognitive content.
Many commentators assume that the senses do so in virtue of themselves
being informed by the forms which the agent intellect impresses on the
possible intellect. These commentators tend to hold that these forms come
into the soul from outside through the senses—call this the form-propaga-
tion interpretation of his conceptual empiricism.6 Examining Thomas’s
accounts of sensible and intellectual cognition will show that the form-
propagation interpretation is incorrect. Indeed, it will show that the forms
which the agent intellect impresses on the possible—intelligible forms—do
not inhere in the senses at all, and that the agent intellect must in abstract-
ing intelligible forms produce a content not present in any sensible cogni-
tion. Intellective abstraction thus consists in more than the intellect’s
precinding from some of the determinate cognitive content—namely, from
the individuating material conditions—contained in phantasms.7
5. This is clear enough from the way Thomas contrasts his view with other
contemporary ones. In particular, he represents his doctrine of intellective abstrac-
tion as one which requires rejecting both the Muslim neo-Platonic view that sepa-
rate intelligences impress intelligible forms on the human intellect and the Platonic
view that sensory perception is the occasion for the intellect’s construction of
intelligible forms merely from itself (QDA 10.6, ST Ia 84.4; see MacDonald’s helpful
discussion in “Theory of Knowledge,” pp. 181–82).
6. Etienne Gilson contends that intelligible species are “contained” in phan-
tasms, “mixed in with the sensible,” so that this abstraction is one in which “a
content which is received from outside” is “intellectualized” (Gilson, The Christian
Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, [New York: Random House, 1956], pp. 218–19, esp.
fn. 27). Other proponents of this interpretation include F. C. Copleston (Aquinas,
[Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1965], p. 176), and Robert M. Adams
(“Where Do Our Ideas Come From,” in Innate Ideas, ed., Stephen Stich [Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1975], pp. 72–74).
7. Thus, D. W. Hamlyn is wrong to deny that, in abstracting, the agent intellect
forms or produces intelligible species (Sensation and Perception, [New York: Humani-
ties Press, 1961], p. 48). Peter Geach is closer to the correct reading when, in a brief
appendix to Mental Acts ([London: Routledge and Paul, 1956], pp. 130–31), he
insightfully suggests that the agent intellect in abstracting intelligible species pro-
duces content not present in phantasms. Much of what follows is devoted to
developing and defending Geach’s suggestion. First and foremost, I specify the
content which the agent intellect produces in intellective abstraction. Thomas’s
view, I argue, is that the agent intellect produces certain universal concep-
tions—most notably, those of being and unity—and realizes them in the determi-
nate content supplied in sense to produce concepts of the determinate being and
unity of various material things. I argue, further, that Thomas assigns the agent
intellect the role of producing the sensible apprehension of the natures of material
things which supplies the sensible data for its intellective abstraction: the agent
intellect produces this apprehension by directing our acts of comparing phantasms.
Note that Geach gives very little by way of textual support for his reading. He cites
two passages, neither of which suffices to establish his reading. In particular, at ST
Ia 79.3 ad 2, Aquinas says nothing to suggest that the agent intellect’s operation can
be likened to physical light’s enabling the eye to see “only if we suppose that colors
are generated by kindling the light—that the light is not just revealing colours that
existed in the dark” (Geach, Mental Acts, p. 130). He says merely that the agent
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I argue that appreciating Aquinas’s account of how we come, in intel-
lective abstraction, first to cognize the natures of things requires attending
to his identification of the agent intellect with the “connatural light of our
souls” (SCG II 77 [5]). This light, he holds, is “nothing more than a
participating likeness in the uncreated light, in which all the divine ideas
are contained” (ST Ia 84.6). In these contexts, Thomas speaks of light, not
in the sense in which it signifies “that which makes things manifest to the
sense of sight,” but rather in the extended one on which it signifies “any-
thing which provides illumination for any kind of cognizing” (ST Ia 67.1).
He refers to the uncreated light, as well as the participating likenesses in
this light had by angels and humans, as “spiritual light” to convey that this
light provides illumination for understanding in much the way physical
light provides illumination for seeing (ST Ia 67.1; cf. SCG III 53). Examining
the way in which Thomas develops this light analogy will show that, in
identifying the agent intellect with the human participating likeness in
uncreated light, Thomas is fitting his Aristotelian-inspired empiricism into
his larger, in many respects neo-Platonic, metaphysics of actuality and po-
tency.8 More specifically, he is aiming to reconcile this empiricism with an
Augustinian doctrine of internal illumination, on which God teaches us
everything through this light (ST Ia 84.5). Appreciating this reconciliation
will expand our understanding of the way Aquinas rests his account of
human cognition on his metaphysics.
I develop my reading of Aquinas’s conceptual empiricism in three
sections. In the first, I focus on Thomas’s account of sensory cognition,
explaining how it is limited to the external accidents of things and does not
reach to the natures of things, because it represents things only in images. I
conclude, pace the form-propagation interpretation, that the intelligible
forms which come to inform our possible intellects are not themselves
conveyed to the soul in sensation. I also clarify the way in which the senses
nonetheless lead the intellect to its cognizing of the natures of things: the
senses apprehend the natures of things in images and thereby provide the
intellect determinate content for its act of abstraction. In the second section,
I examine Aquinas’s account of the way the actuality of all acts of under-
standing (intelligere) consists in spiritual light. In doing so, I explain how, on
this account, all that one can come to cognize pre-exists in one’s intellect.
Moreover, I set the stage for examining Aquinas’s abstractionism, by sketch-
ing how each species of created intellect has its place in the hierarchy of
being set by the degree to which its intellect is a participating likeness in the
uncreated light of divine understanding. Finally, in the third section, I
intellect makes phantasms actually intelligible. The other text Geach cites (ST Ia
85.2 ad 3) also fails to support his reading.
8. See, Norris Clark, “The Limitation of Act by Potency: Aristotelianism or
Neo-Platonism,” The New Scholasticism 26 (1952): 180.
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distinguish two roles that Aquinas assigns to the agent intellect in his ac-
count of the process by which we come to cognize the natures of material
things. First, the agent intellect is indirectly responsible for our senses’
achieving an apprehension of the various natures of material things—the
apprehension that provides determinate data for this abstraction. Second,
the agent intellect abstracts actually intelligible species from phantasms in
cognizing the substance underlying the proper accidents the senses cognize
in phantasms, through its innate universal cognitions of the being and unity
of things. Both of these roles, moreover, are ones of which the agent intellect
is capable only in virtue of itself already containing virtually—though to be
sure, only in partial potency, so as to require its being augmented with
phantasms—the species, which it abstracts from phantasms.
I. THE LIMITS OF SENSORY COGNITION
I. Cognitive Species as Form and as Content of Cognition
Aquinas conceives of human intellectual and sensible cognition as consist-
ing in formal assimilation—in the subject of cognition having in its cogni-
tive faculties a form which is a likeness of the object’s form. In particular,
he holds that a subject cognizes objects insofar as forms inhere in its
cognitive faculties and operate as principles of its acts of cognizing. Forms
operate as such principles by determining the act of cognizing to produce
intentional objects, objects internal to the subject, which are likenesses of
the things which are their corresponding external objects. Thomas holds,
moreover, that what the subject typically cognizes is the external object, not
the internal object: one usually cognizes the external object through the
internal object, much as one usually looks at oneself, and not one’s image,
through one’s image in the mirror.
It would be natural, in developing this thumbnail sketch of Thomas’s
conception of human cognizing, to focus on his claim to be espousing
direct realism: Can he both posit an intentional object and avoid repre-
sentationalism?9 Answering this question is not, however, crucial to our
present purposes. I want to focus instead on bringing out some aspects of
his conception of cognition as formal assimilation which will be particularly
salient in our subsequent discussions.
Let me begin with a brief point of clarification. The force of Aquinas’s
claim that the form in the subject of cognition is like that in the correspond-
ing object is not to deny that, in cognition, specifically the same form
9. For an interesting discussion of Thomas’s direct realism regarding human
intellectual cognition, see Kretzmann’s “Philosophy of Mind,” pp. 140–42.
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inheres in the subject and object. It is rather simply to indicate that the form
of red does not, insofar as it inheres in a subject as the principle of its
cognition, make that subject red in the way in which it makes the corre-
sponding object red (see, for instance, DV 10.8 ad 2). Aquinas puts the point
in his technical terminology as follows: in seeing a red thing, the subject
takes on the form of red only in spiritual or intentional being, and not in
natural being (CDA II lec. 27)10 I suggest that, in analogous fashion,
Thomas’s calling the inner object that a subject produces in its act of
cognizing a likeness of the object of the cognition merely reflects that it is
not, itself, an external object. On this reading, Aquinas does not owe us an
account that specifies the relevant respect in which, or degree to which, the
form or intentional object of a cognizing must be like its object.11
What we need to see is that Thomas distinguishes between two formal
likenesses of the object present in a subject of cognition: between the form
that operates as the principle of its act of cognizing, on the one hand, and
the intentional object produced in that act of cognizing, on the other.
Moreover, Thomas remarks that the phrases ‘sensible species’ or ‘intelligi-
ble species’ can be used to refer to either of these formal likenesses, and so
in two senses: (a) to refer to species which inform the senses or the
(possible) intellect and function as the principles of acts of sensing or
understanding; or (b) to refer to the sensible or intellectual intentions
which are the internal objects of these acts (DV 3.2; Quodlibeta 5.2).12
10. Thomas’s conception of the way in which sensible forms take on spiritual
being in sense-perception has received considerable discussion. See John Deely,
“The Immateriality of the Intentional as Such,” New Scholasticism 42 (1968):293–306;
S. M. Cohon, “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial Reception of Sensible Forms,”
The Philosophical Review 91 (1982):193–209; John Haldane, “Aquinas on Sense-Per-
ception,” The Philosophical Review 92 (1983):233–39; Paul Hoffman, “St. Thomas
Aquinas on the Halfway State of Sensible Being,” The Philosophical Review 99
(1990):73–92; Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, chap. 1; and Stump, “Aquinas on Sen-
sory Cognition.”
11. Many scholars have taken Thomas’s characterization of a cognitive species
as a likeness (similitudo) of its corresponding object as expressing an iconic view of
representation—on which, for instance, a visual species is a colored image. See, for
instance, Martin Tweedale, “Mental Representations in Later Medieval Scholasti-
cism,” in Historical Foundations of Cognitive Science, ed. J. C. Smith (Boston: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1990), pp. 35–51. Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, Chap. 3; and
Stump, “Sensory Cognition” and “Mechanisms of Intellective Cognition,” have
recently argued against this reading, contending that, in Thomas’s sense, A can
share a form with B without A’s being an eidetic likeness of B. My reading comple-
ments the second view by providing an explanation of why Aquinas says that a
cognitive species is a likeness of its object, despite not holding an iconic view of
representation.
12. Remarking on the ontological status of intentions, Aquinas holds first that
they are essential accidents of a cognitive faculty in (second) actuality; they proceed
from this actualized faculty as “actus ex actu” (SCG IV 14 [3]). Second, although
intentions are distinct from the substance of a cognitive faculty, there is no real
distinction between these internal objects of cognitive activity and that activity itself:
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Aquinas often employs ‘species’ in the first sense. So, for instance, at
SCG I 53 [2–4] he tells us that humans understand an external thing by
having its species (in sense[a]) in its intellect, so that, “once in act through
this species as through its own form, the intellect cognizes the thing itself.”
And, he holds, the understanding is a cognition of that thing, because this
species which is its “principle of operation” is a “likeness (similitudo) of the
thing understood.” Proponents of the form-propagation reading of his
conceptual empiricism use ‘intelligible species’ in this sense in ascribing to
Aquinas the position that intelligible species come into our souls through
sensation.13
But Thomas also uses ‘intelligible species’ in sense (b), to refer to the
intentions which the intellect forms in understanding:
We must further consider that the intellect, having been informed by
the species of the thing, by an act of understanding forms within itself
a certain intention (intentionem) of the thing understood, that is to say,
its notion (ratio). . . . Now, since this understood intention is, as it were,
a terminus of intelligible operation, it is distinct from the intelligible
species that actualizes the intellect, and that we must consider the
principle of intellectual operation, though both are likenesses of the
thing understood. (SCG I 53 [2–4])
Intellectual intentions, as the internal objects or termini of our under-
standing, appear, roughly, to be the content of this understanding. Thomas
uses ‘intentio intellecta’ as synonymous with ‘conceptio’ (DPD VIII, I). He also
speaks of these intentions as ‘mental words’ or ‘inner words’ (SCG IV 11
[6]) which are signified by the ‘outer words’ which we speak and write.14 It
will prove important to see that intellectual intentions, or notions, are a
particular kind of intention, and are to be contrasted with sensible inten-
tions. For, as we will see in Section I.iii, on Aquinas’s account, we can form
In activities which take place in the agent the object which is the end
of the activity is the agent itself: the object in the agent is the activity
actually taking place. Thus we read in Aristotle that the sensible actual-
ized is the sense in activity and the intelligible actualized is the intellect
in activity. (ST Ia 14.2)
Likewise, whereas human intellectual intentions contrast with the divine mental
Word in being distinct from the substance of the intellect from which they proceed,
Aquinas tells us that in each case “The act of being of the intention understood
consists in its very being understood” (SCG IV 11 [6]). For a careful study of
Aquinas’s use of the term ‘intentio,’ see Robert Schmidt, The Domain of Logic
according to St. Thomas Aquinas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).
13. See Hamlyn (Sensation and Perception, p. 48) and Adams, (“Where Do Our
Ideas Come From?”).
14. This is, of course, something like the view of language Aristotle advances
in the opening chapter of On Interpretation.
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intellectual intentions of the natures of things, only in virtue of having
already formed sensible intentions of these natures, but it is only in forming
intellectual intentions of the natures of things that we cognize these na-
tures. Moreover, that the senses can form intentions of the natures of
material things, even though they cannot cognize these natures shows that,
on Aquinas’s view, one cognizes a thing, not in forming just any intention
of that thing, but only in forming an intention which is a formal likeness of
that thing.
II. Sensible Cognition of the Proper and Common Sensibles
Thomas follows Aristotle in distinguishing between the proper, common,
and accidental sensibles (DA 3.1; 424b 22f; CDA 3.1). The proper sensibles
are accidental qualities of material things so named because each is the
proper object of one of the five external senses: we sense color only through
our faculty of sight, sound only through our faculty of hearing, and so on.
Indeed, what makes an accidental form the proper, or per se, object of a
sense is its being the case that the nature of that sense is to generate an
intention which is, in respect of that form, a likeness of a material thing,
through its being affected by that thing (ST Ia 78.3c). The common sensi-
bles, in contrast, are those accidental forms, like shape and motion, which
are objects of more than one sense: one can both see and feel a round
shape. All of the common sensibles, Thomas holds, are reducible ultimately
to extensive quantity and its modifications; and this quantity, in turn, is the
primary accident of material things and is the proximate subject of all the
proper sensibles (ST Ia 78.3 ad 2). Finally, there are the accidental sensibles,
such as Cleon’s son. These are the particular material substances which, as
the proximate subjects of extensive quantity, underlie all the other sensible
accidents as their ultimate subjects. In contrast to both the proper and the
common sensibles, the accidental sensibles are only accidentally objects of
sense, because their operation is not of itself the proper object of any sense
(CDA 3.1 [580]). They are, nonetheless, sensible objects, because sense can
discern differences among the natures of particular substances through its
comparison of different images.
The proper sensibles, Thomas holds, are active qualities that act “first
and by their nature” on the external senses; in doing so, they inform the
external senses with their formal likenesses and thus cause themselves to be
seen. In short, Thomas explains how we come to have the form of proper
sensibles as principles of our acts of sensing with a straightforward applica-
tion of his general, Aristotelian theory of change as the propagation of
form: the apple has the form of red and acts by propagating this form to
the sense of sight; the form of red received in the faculty of sight, in turn,
directs the act of seeing the redness of the apple.
Thomas’s account of our apprehension of common sensibles is quite
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different from, and rather more complicated than, his account of the
proper sensibles. For the common sensibles, on his view, are not active
qualities at all and, thus, do not act on a sentient being directly and “by
their nature” but only “through the proper sensibles.” On the other hand,
they are not sensed per accidens, as are the accidental sensibles. To see this,
consider that, as the immediate subject of the proper sensibles, common
sensibles directly affect the way in which the proper sensibles act on the
external senses: the redness of an apple affects us in a certain way because
it inheres in the spherical surface of the apple (ST Ia 78.3 ad 2). But
Thomas holds, again following Aristotle, that none of the external senses
discriminate among common sensibles. It is, rather, only through the op-
eration of an inner sense, one which compares the objects of the various
external senses, that we discriminate among common sensibles, so that
they emerge as distinct objects of our sensing. Take, again, our case of the
red apple. Aquinas argues that, if we had only the sense of sight, we could
not distinguish the color of the apple from its shape. We are able to sense
the shape of the apple as something distinct from its color because its
shape also immediately affects the way our other senses are affected and
because we can compare the cognitions of our various external senses
(CDA 3.1 [582]; cf. 2.13 [390]). Thomas names the faculty of inner sense
which performs this comparison, one which thus can discriminate between
all the various objects of the external senses and compile them to form
one coherent whole (ST Ia 78.4 ad 2), the common sense. The common
sensibles are not sensed per accidens, because they are the per se objects of
the common sense.
As we will see, Thomas holds that we have three other internal senses
besides the common: the imagination, the particular reason, and the sense
memory. For present purposes, what is crucial is his account of the imagi-
nation, because phantasms are the intentional objects of acts of imagining.
Thomas holds that the imagination, like the common sense, has the images
of things as its object: “the objects of imagination and sense are certain
accidents from which the shape (figura) or image (imago) of the thing is
made up” (DV 10.4 ad 1). That the imagination has the same objects as the
common sense is not surprising, given that the imagination is the inner
sense which functions as “a treasure-store of forms received through the
senses” (ST Ia 78.4c; cf. QDA 4 ad 2). Part of the import of the imagination’s
being a treasure-store of these forms is that it is capable of employing these
forms to produce intentions of objects which are no longer present to the
senses, as well of dividing and compounding these forms to produce new
intentions, intentions which have objects which we have never seen: he thus
describes the imagination as a faculty which “forms for itself a model
[idolum] of something absent or even of something never seen” (ST Ia 85.2
ad 3). Phantasms, thus, consists of images. The senses, thus, must supply the
agent intellect with material for its abstraction in the form of images. To
begin to see how, on Thomas’s view, these images play this role we need to
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attend to his account of the way in which our internal senses apprehend the
natures of things, albeit without cognizing those natures.
III. The Senses’ Apprehension of the Natures of Things
We have seen that sensible cognition culminates in forming images of
things. We will now see that, because one does not cognize a thing’s nature
merely in forming images of it, the senses cannot cognize the natures of
things. Nonetheless, our senses do apprehend the nature of a material
thing by apprehending its proper accidents—the range of possible external
accidents distinctive of any thing which has that nature. Appreciating this
point will clarify what the senses supply, in phantasms, to the intellect for its
act of abstracting actually intelligible species from them. It will also put us
in a position to see just what this abstraction accomplishes, by clarifying
what kind of likeness of a material thing its intelligible species must be.
Thomas is emphatic that, in forming images of things, the senses have
yet to “reach” the essence of these things:
(1) The name “intellect” derives from the fact that it has cognition
of the intimate characteristics of a thing; for intelligere is by way of saying
intus legere [to read penetratingly]. Senses and imagination have cogni-
tion of external accidents only; intellect alone succeeds in reaching a
thing’s essence. (DV 1.12)
(2) What is cognized by intellectual sight are the things themselves,
not their images (imagines). This differs from bodily (sensitive) vision
and spiritual (imaginative) vision.15 For the objects of imagination and
sense are certain accidents from which the shape (figura) or image
(imago) of the thing is made up. But the object of the intellect is the
very essence of the thing, although the intellect cognizes the essence
of the thing through its likeness, as through a means of cognizing, and
not as through an object over which its vision is first carried.16 (DV 10.4
ad 1)
(3) Sense is lead through it [a form received from things] to a
cognition of the external accidents; the intellect reaches to the bare
quiddity of the thing, distinguishing it from all material conditions.
Thus, when the mental cognizing is said to take its origin from sense,
this does not mean that sense apprehends all that the mind cognizes,
but that, from those things which sense apprehends, the mind is led on
15. In glossing imaginative cognition with “spiritual vision,” Aquinas is adopt-
ing Augustine’s terminology: at ST Ia 78.4 ad 6, he tells us that by “spiritual vision,”
Augustine means a sensing “of a bodily likeness in the absence of body,” and that
all acts of inner apprehension are instances of spiritual vision in this sense. He does
not mean to imply that imagination is not a faculty of inner sense.
16. I take Thomas in this last sentence to be expressing his direct realism
about intellective cognition (cf. Kretzmann, “Philosophy of Mind,” pp. 140–42).
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to something more, just as intellectual cognition of sensible things
leads to cognition of divine things. (DV 10.6 ad 2; cf. SCG IV 11 [15])
Moreover, even in being formally assimilated to sensible qualities (such as
red and cold), sensible cognition does not have the natures of these quali-
ties as its object: thus Aquinas writes that “Cognizing the natures of sensible
qualities belongs to intellect, not the sense” (ST Ia 78.3c). Thus, the formal
assimilation by which we sense a red thing, and the formal assimilation by
which we understand it do not differ merely in that sense is of particulars,
whereas the intellect is of universals.
Before we take a closer look at the passages extracted above, it will be
useful to note that Aquinas does not mean to imply that the senses do not
in any way apprehend the natures of things—even the natures of sub-
stances. As the first passage suggests, he means to deny only that the senses
cognize the natures of things. This point is confirmed by Aquinas’s claim (to
which we will return in Section III) that we can form intellectual intentions
of the natures of material things only in virtue of our having already
achieved an apprehension of these natures in sense:
sensing is properly and per se of the singular, but yet there is somehow
even a sensing of the universal. For sense cognizes Callias not only so
far as he is Callias, but also as he is this man; and similarly, Socrates as
he is this man. As a result of such an attainment pre-existing in sense,
the intellectual soul can consider man in both. But if it were in the very
nature of things that sense could apprehend only that which pertains
to particularity, and along with this could in no wise apprehend the
nature in the particular, it would not be possible for universal cognition
to be caused in us from sense-apprehension. (CPA I lec. 20)
Since he here clearly asserts that the senses do, in some way, apprehend the
natures of material things, charity requires that we not read (3) as denying
that the senses have any apprehension of these natures. The “something
more” that the intellect apprehends, and which the sense does not, is not
the nature of a particular material thing. As we will see, it is, rather, the
nature of being itself and, thereby, the nature of material substance as what
underlies the sensible accidents of a thing.
So what makes a sensible intention of the nature of a material thing a
mere apprehension, and not a cognition, of that nature? Aquinas’s answer,
in outline, is as follows: an intention constitutes a cognition of a nature only
if it is a formal likeness of a nature; any formal likeness of a nature must be
a formal likeness of a substance; a sensible intention is not a formal likeness
of a substance; it is thus not a cognition of any nature.
This answer is implicit in the way (2) and (3) connect the claim that
senses and the imagination do not cognize the natures of things with their
cognizing only the external accidents of material things. This connection
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reflects Thomas’s view that implicit in a cognition of the nature of an
accident—an understanding of that accident—is the cognition of the na-
ture of the underlying substance on which that accident depends—an
understanding of that substance. For example, the definition of color
specifies a surface of a body, and that of a surface, a body; thus, we cannot
come to understand sensible accidents, without also thereby understanding
the corresponding substance in which it inheres, that is, body. Now the
content of a sensible intention of the nature of a material thing consists in
the proper accidents of that thing—the external accidents which are dis-
tinctive of all those things which share that nature. As we shall see in Section
III.iii, Thomas holds that we are able to form such intentions only through
our particular reason, a faculty which compares phantasms. For the present,
the crucial point is that such an intention is a formal likeness, not of the
substance of the thing, but rather only of its external accidents. This
reading also explains why (1), (2), and (3) all contrast representing things
in images with cognizing their natures: images are formal likenesses only of
external accidents; in apprehending successions of images distinctive of a
certain nature, we apprehend that nature, but do not cognize it.
In short, Thomas holds that only the intellect can cognize the natures
of things, including the natures of the sensible accidents, because only it
can be formally assimilated to substances, and not just to external accidents.
In deriving any intelligible form from phantasms—even the intelligible
forms of a material thing’s sensible accidents—the intellect goes beyond
what is apprehended in sensibility, insofar as it produces a form which is a
likeness of substance and, in the case of a thing’s sensible accidents, a
formal likeness of the way in which these forms inhere in a substance, as
well.
Notice the claim in (3) that the intellect is led to the natures of things
through images, as sense is lead to cognizing the external accidents of
things in its images of things through the forms which it receives from
them. Through our sensible apprehension, in phantasms, of the possible
range of images proper to, and so distinctive of, the nature of a material
thing, our intellect can arrive at a cognition of the substance underlying its
external accidents, and thereby cognize the quiddity that constitutes that
thing itself.
Because substantial forms in themselves are unknown, but become
known to us by their proper accidents, substantial differences are
frequently taken from accidents instead of from the substantial forms
which become known through such accidents. (OSC 11 ad 3)
And, as his remark that the primary mark of the essence of a thing is its
shape (DV 10.5c) suggests, the crucial content of our apprehension of
proper accidents consists of determinate common sensibles.
In short, Aquinas maintains that there is a parallel between on the one
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hand the successive metaphysical layers of a material thing—its sensible
secondary accidents, its primary accident of quantity (as signing corporeal
matter), and its substance ‘standing under’ the first two—and on the other
the corresponding human cognitive faculties—the external senses, the
internal senses, and the intellect. Indeed, we will see in Section III that,
much as the common sense is lead to the common sensible forms of
material things through its comparison of the proper sensibles appre-
hended in our external senses, so too our intellect is lead to the intelligible
forms of things through the particular reason’s comparison of the images
apprehended in our common sense and stored in our imagination.
Note, finally, how the points adduced in the present section tell against
the form-propagation interpretation of Aquinas’s conceptual empiricism.
Indeed, only our sensory cognition of the proper sensibles is adequately
explained in terms of the propagation of forms. For the only forms which,
in sensation, are directly propagated into the soul are those of the proper
sensibles. The common sense must generate the forms of the common
sensibles by comparing the intentions of proper sensibles.17 Since only the
sensible forms of the proper sensibles are received directly in sensation, the
agent intellect’s abstraction of intelligible forms from phantasms is not one
in which it simply separates an intelligible form received directly in sense
cognition from the material conditions with which it is mixed in. Moreover,
since the sense and the imagination are restricted to representing things in
images and thus cognize things merely in respect of their external acci-
dents, sensible intentions are not formal likenesses of the natures of mate-
rial things either; because these faculties cannot generate intentions which
are formal likenesses of substances, they cannot generate any formal like-
nesses of the natures of accidents. In order to generate any actually intelli-
gible species from phantasms, the agent intellect must derive from them a
formal likeness of the substance of things, a form which is not itself appre-
hended by either our sense or our imagination.
II. THE HIERARCHY OF SPIRITUAL LIGHT AND THE
NATURE OF THE INTELLECT
The aim of the present section is to sketch Aquinas’s conception of the
intellect, the power to cognize the natures of things. Since the nature of a
thing is the inner principle (principium) that determines its distinctive
manner of being, the intellect is the power to form an intention which is a
17. To be sure, as we have seen, our intentions of proper sensibles contribute
to the common sense’s production of the forms of the common sensibles, so that
we can speak of these forms as coming to the common sense through our sensing
of the proper sensibles. But this is no longer the simple form-propagation model.
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determinate likeness of a principle which constitutes the nature of a thing.
Thomas develops this conception in the framework of his theistic metaphys-
ics. On this metaphysics, God’s essence is to be, and the essence of every
other being consists in a distinctive way of participating in God’s act of
being. Moreover, the essence of a created intellect consists in the distinctive
way in which it participates in God’s power of understanding. And since
God’s power of understanding consists in uncreated spiritual light, the
power of any created intellect consists in a participating likeness in the
uncreated light. Created intellects form a hierarchy under the divine intel-
lect which is determined by how nearly these intellects’ spiritual lights
resemble the uncreated light. The resulting sketch of Aquinas’s conception
of the intellect will prepare us for examining his account of the way in which
the agent intellect, as the human participating likeness in the uncreated
light, consists in the power to abstract actually intelligible species from
phantasms.18
To understand the hierarchy of intelligences, one needs to see how,
following Augustine, Aquinas holds that God gives things existence in two
modes of being:
As Augustine says in the De Genesi ad litteram, the things which pre-ex-
isted from eternity in the divine Word flowed forth in two ways: one way
in the angelic intellect; another way that they subsisted in their own
natures.19 (ST 56.2; cf. 55.2, 57.2, and QDA 18c).
The mode of being that things have in intellects, Thomas calls “esse intelligi-
ble,” that whereby they subsist in their own natures, “esse naturale” (ST Ia
56.2).20 The former is the intentional being that these things take on as the
internal objects of created acts of understanding. We will see that the
brighter a creature’s spiritual light, and thus the more it resembles the
uncreated light, the more the way in which things exist in its understanding
resembles the way these things pre-exist in the divine Word. It thereby also
determines a created intellect’s place in the hierarchy of created intellects,
for this hierarchy is determined by the degree to which the distinctive way
in which creatures understand things approaches that of God.
I turn, then, to Aquinas’s account of the hierarchy of spiritual light,
beginning at the top, with the way in which the uncreated spiritual light
constitutes divine cognition.
18. For a helpful general discussion of Aquinas’s account of divine cognition,
see Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, “God’s Knowledge and its Causal
Efficacy,” in The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith, ed. Thomas D. Senor
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 94–124.
19. Dicendum quod sicut Augustinus dicit, ea quae in Verbo Dei ab aeterno
praeexisterunt dupliciter ab eo effluxerunt: uno modo in intellectum angelicum;
alio modo ut subsisterent in propriis naturis.
20. Piana has “intellectuale.”
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I. Uncreated Spiritual Light
God is “pure actuality both in the order of existence and in the order of
understanding” (ST Ia 14.2 ad 3). Indeed, since there is no real distinction
between God’s esse and intelligere, these two orders merge at the top. More-
over, because God’s intelligere is not limited by a intelligible species or
essence really distinct from that act itself, it is pure and infinite: the divine,
uncreated spiritual light is pure and infinitely bright (CBDT 1.2c).
Aquinas holds that all things pre-exist supersubstantially in God, in
accordance with his own simple esse (ST Ia 57.1c). They do so, not merely
in that they are archetypically caused by God as imperfect and limited
participating likenesses of his esse, but also in that God cognizes them,
having ideas (rationes) of them according to which he creates them (ST Ia
15.1c).
These ideas are that which God cognizes, not species or forms by which
God cognizes. Since he is simple, the only form by which God cognizes is his
essence. Nonetheless, through his essence, God understands not only him-
self, but also all other things, because the essences of all other things are
simply various ways of participating in God’s being; God’s self-cognition
thus contains the divine ideas of all possible things (ST Ia 15.1c).
Thomas speaks of these divine ideas as “contained in the uncreated
light” (ST Ia 84.5c). Understanding this image requires seeing how Aquinas
restricts his analogy between physical and spiritual light: although physical
light is the source (principium) of color, because color is caused, not solely
by physical light, but by different dispositions of the media which receive it,
it contains color only generally, not specifically, in its diversity and plurality.
In contrast, the uncreated light, as the sole cause of all the perfections of
creatures, contains them specifically and distinctly “in an eminent degree”
(ST Ia 14.6; cf. 55.2 ad 1; 84.2). Aquinas illustrates this eminent contain-
ment by likening it to the way the number 6 contains the numbers 2 and 3
(ST Ia 14.6)
II. Created Spiritual Light
In Aquinas’s view, created intellects also consist of spiritual light, but are
finite, dim, and imperfect participating likenesses in God’s uncreated light.
As natural esse is limited and multiplied by inherence in essences, so spiri-
tual light, as intelligible esse, is limited and multiplied by inherence in the
essences of intellectual substances. And, as mentioned earlier, what deter-
mines the hierarchy of created intellectual substances is the strength of
their respective participating likenesses in God’s uncreated light and, con-
sequently, the degree to which their manner of understanding resembles
God’s.
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1. Angelic Spiritual Light. Unlike God, angels need intelligible species
in addition to their own essences in order to understand other things. But,
like God, they properly represent many things through each of these intel-
ligible species. These intelligible species are universals which are capable
“in their unity” of representing “the distinct and proper nature” of a diver-
sity of things (ST Ia 55.3 ad 3).21 This requires that these species not be
derived by abstraction from its objects, so as to “take their measure from the
thing they represent” (ST Ia 55.3 ad 3; cf. DV 3.5, QDA 20). They must,
rather, be universals which “pre-exist before the things” cognized, “either in
the order of causation, as universal ideas of things are in the Divine Word,
or at least in the order of nature, as universal ideas are in angelic intellects”
(ST Ia 55.3 ad 1).22
The hierarchy of angelic understanding is based on how nearly angels
emulate the way God understands everything in the divine “primal unity”
(uni primo) (ST Ia 55.3). The more universal its innate species, and thus the
fewer such species it requires to understand everything (in first actuality),
the more like God it is (ST Ia 55.3; cf. QDA 18, ST Ia 89.1).23 And the sort
and number of species it requires is determined by how strong their partici-
pated spiritual light is:
In all intellectual substances the intellectual power comes from the
influence of the divine light. Now this in its primal source (primo
principio) is one and simple; and the further intellectual creatures are
from this source the more the light will be divided and diversified, as
with lines radiating from a center. Thus God, by his one essence
understands all things. The superior intellectual substances, though
they understand through more than one form, nevertheless do so
through forms which are fewer, more universal, and more powerful in
comprehending things, because of the strength of their intellectual
power; in the inferior, however, the forms are more numerous, less
universal, and less powerful in comprehending things, because their
intellectual powers fall short of those of the superior. (ST Ia 89.1)
Moreover, Aquinas continues,
If lower substances had forms with the universality that higher ones
have, then they would not, because they do not have the same efficacy
in understanding, receive through them a perfect cognition of things,
but a general and confused cognition.
21. These universals, moreover, are capable of representing things both in
their general natures and in their singularity (ST Ia 57.2).
22. Vel secundum ordinem causae, sicut universales rerum rationes sunt in
Verbo Dei, vel saltem ordine naturae, sicut universales rerum rationes sunt in
intellectu angelico.
23. Notice how this hierarchy employs a Platonic conception of knowledge as
consisting in the grasp of the way things stand in interrelation to the whole.
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Notice that, on Aquinas’s view, a creature does not understand a thing
simply in virtue of possessing an intelligible form that represents it, but in
virtue of possessing spiritual light, or intelligere, sufficient (in conjunction
with an intelligible form), to form an intellectual intention which is a
distinct likeness of that thing (cf. Section I.1). In short, understanding
consists in participated intelligible esse, just as subsistence consists in partici-
pated natural esse. And, in providing creatures with spiritual light, God
supplies all intelligere for the order of understanding, just as he provides all
natural esse for the existence of creatures.
2. Human Spiritual Light. Aquinas holds that human spiritual light,
too, is had by participation in the divine light. He invokes this position in
subscribing to the Augustinian doctrine of divine illumination:
something [may be] cognized in another as in a source (principium) of
cognition; as we say that things seen by sunlight are seen in the sun. In
this sense we must say that the human soul cognizes everything in the
divine eternal ideas (rationibus), and that by participation in them we
cognize everything. For the intellectual light in us is nothing more than
a participating likeness in the uncreated light, in which all the divine
ideas are contained. (ST Ia 84.5).
Moreover, he holds that the agent intellect, as the human participating
likeness in the uncreated light, constitutes all of the actuality of its acts of
understanding (CBDT 1.3; ST Ia 84.5).24 In particular, Aquinas insists that,
in producing intelligible forms in the possible intellect to actualize its
potency to understand, this light supplies the actuality of the resulting
intelligere or acts of understanding (QDA 4 ad 6). Thus, spiritual light consti-
tutes the actuality of all human acts of understanding, as divine and angelic
spiritual light constitute, respectively, the actuality of divine and angelic acts
of understanding.
At the same time, by identifying this spiritual light with the agent
intellect, Aquinas uses his hierarchy of spiritual light to motivate an Aristo-
telian conceptual empiricism: he contends that, our light being the weakest
and most diffuse of all, were we to understand “in the mode proper to
separate substances,” we “would not have perfect, but confused and general
cognition”; our spiritual light is too dim to illumine any nonabstracted
intelligible forms, no matter how limited their range, in such a way as to
grasp distinctly the natures represented generally in these species (ST Ia
89.1; QDA 18). Indeed, to achieve the cognition proper to our intellects, our
souls must be joined to a body so that the resulting composite (in particular,
24. Thus, he tells us that in its separated state, the soul “will receive through
its possible intellect species flowing from higher substances, and through its agent
intellect it will have the power to understand” (QDA 15 ad 7). Furthermore, he adds,
because the species through which it understands in this state are too universal for
its natural light to suffice, the separated soul has merely a confused and imperfect
cognition.
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the imagination) can present phantasms from which our spiritual
light—the agent intellect—can abstract intelligible forms suitable to our
feeble intellects. As a result of this conjunction, the intellect naturally
converts (convertio) to these phantasms, and the agent intellect employs
these phantasms to produce an intelligible form in the possible intellect,
thereby realizing the possible intellect’s potency to understand.25
Human spiritual light thus has a natural operation unique in the
hierarchy of intellects: the function of producing, by abstraction from
phantasms, intelligible forms (QDA 4). The divine light, having no need of
intelligible forms distinct from the divine essence, does not have this func-
tion. Angelic spiritual light has no such function either: because God
creates each angel with the innate intelligible forms that perfect its potency
to understand, producing such forms by abstraction from phantasms is not
a natural operation of its intellect.
Although the natural operation of spiritual light in human cognition
differs in this fundamental respect from that in angelic cognition, the
continuities between them will prove crucial to understanding Aquinas’s
account of the agent intellect. We will see, in particular, that both of these
natural operations are ones in which spiritual light can produce distinct
likenesses of the natures of things only in virtue of these likenesses being
virtually contained in it, in a way analogous to that in which the divine ideas
are contained in the uncreated light: created spiritual light can produce a
likeness of the distinctive way in which a created thing participates in divine
being, only in virtue of being itself a participating likeness in the divine
spiritual light. And the natural operations of created intellects differ from
that of the divine in needing to be supplemented by some determinate
likeness of things in order to produce determinate likenesses of the natures
of created things. In these respects, seeing how the human intellect falls at
the bottom of a hierarchy of created intellects will prove helpful in inter-
preting Aquinas’s account of the agent intellect. Indeed, it will help clarify
how, by identifying the agent intellect with the human share in spiritual
light, and spiritual light generally with the actuality of intelligere, Thomas
combines an Augustinian theory of internal illumination and an Aristote-
lian conceptual empiricism within his metaphysics of act and potency.
III. Thomas’s Conception of Understanding
In examining Thomas’s hierarchy of intelligences, we have, in effect, con-
firmed and developed the schematic reading of his conception of under-
25. See, for instance, QDA 18 ad 1, where Aquinas speaks of the possible
intellect’s gaze (aspectus) being fixed on lower things as a result of its union with the
body. Aquinas goes on to note that, once separated from the body, the human
intellect turns its gaze to higher things and cognizes in an angelic mode.
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standing presented at the opening of the present section. On this reading,
Aquinas holds that to cognize a thing’s nature is to form an intention which
is a determinate likeness of that nature—the principle which determines
the distinctive way in which that thing has its being. We have seen that, on
his theistic metaphysics, the nature of any created thing consists in the
distinctive way in which that thing participates in divine being, because God
is the being whose essence is to be. Cognizing the nature of a created thing
consists in having spiritual light insofar as this light constitutes an intention,
which is a likeness of the way in which that thing is an imperfect participat-
ing likeness in the divine being.
The uncreated light, as a perfect grasp of the divine essence, consti-
tutes an intention which is a distinct and proper likeness of the natures
of all created things; it thus eminently contains the ideas of all created
things, ideas which serve as the archetypal principles according to which
God creates these things. Created spiritual light is itself a participating
likeness in the divine light, and thus is the right kind of thing to constitute
a formal likeness of the way in which a thing is a possible imperfect
participation in divine being, and thus an intention in and through which
one cognizes the nature of a thing. This explains why Aquinas infers from
the intellect’s being incorporeal, that it naturally cognizes natures: imma-
terial intentional being is a participating likeness in the divine act of un-
derstanding, intelligere, which eminently contains the divine ideas, perfect
formal likenesses of the inner causes of all possible created things.26 It
also explains why the senses, as corporeal powers, have their cognition
restricted to the external accidents of material things. And it follows, more-
over, that a created intellect cognizes a thing’s nature by participating,
however faintly and imperfectly, in God’s grasp of the way in which that
thing participates in divine being.27 In explicating Aquinas’s account of
intellective abstraction, we would do well to attend to how it specifies the
distinctive manner in which human cognizing of the natures of things
participates, through the light of the agent intellect, in the divine cognition
of the natures of things.
26. Thomas holds that the intellect’s being a capacity of cognizing natures is
a natural consequence of its incorporeality. So, in characterizing the two cognitive
powers of our soul, he writes:
One is the act of a corporeal organ, and it is natural for it to have
cognition of things as they exist in individuating matter, which is why
sense has cognition only of individuals. But the soul’s other cognitive
power is intellect, which is not the act of any corporeal organ. And so
through intellect it is natural for us to have cognition of natures. (ST
Ia 12.4c)
27. This point lies behind Aquinas’s claim that only intelligences are created
in God’s image (ST Ia 93.2, 3, 6c; cf. Stump’s helpful discussion of these passages
in sec. IV of “Foundations of Knowledge.”)
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III. SPIRITUAL LIGHT AND THE PRODUCTION OF
ACTUALLY INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES
In Aquinas’s terminology, an object is actually intelligible, insofar as it is
actually capable of acting on our possible intellect, so as to actualize its
potentiality to understand—just as an object is actually visible, insofar as it
is actually capable of acting on our sense of sight, so as to actualize its
potentiality to see (ST Ia 70.3c, 4c; QDA 4; CDA III, 10 [730–31]; DV 10.6c).
The agent intellect’s role in generating our cognition of the natures of
material things from our sensible cognition of these things is, most gener-
ally, that of making sense-perceptible things actually intelligible:
When our mind is considered in relation to sense-perceptible things
that exist outside the soul, it is found to be related to them in two ways.
It is related to them in one way as actuality to potentiality—insofar as
things outside the soul are potentially intelligible and the mind itself is
actually intelligible. It is in this respect that we say that in the mind
there is agent intellect, which makes things actually intelligible. It is
related to them in the other way as potentiality to actuality—insofar as
the determinate forms of things, which exist actually in things outside
the soul, are in our mind only potentially. It is in this respect that we
say that in our soul there is possible intellect, which has the function of
receiving the forms abstracted from sense-perceptible things and made
actually intelligible by the light of the agent intellect. (DV 10.6c)
And the agent intellect makes sense-perceptible things intelligible by de-
riving their determinate forms from our sensible cognition of them and
making these forms actually intelligible. Sense-perceptible things supply
the determinate forms of things, our mind, the actual intelligibility of
these forms.
Notice that Thomas explains the agent’s intellect’s capacity to make
things actually intelligible by reference to its being the respect in which the
mind itself is actually intelligible. Now the mind is itself actually intelligible
insofar as it is capable of cognizing itself. And, on Thomas’s view, the mind
cognizes itself through its own act of cognizing:
our intellect understands itself according as it is made actual by species
abstracted from sensibles through the light of the agent intellect, which
is the actuality of intelligibles and by means of them, also of the possible
intellect. Therefore our intellect cognizes itself, not by means of its own
essence, but by means of its activity. (ST Ia 87.1c)
As what constitutes the actuality of all our acts of understanding, the agent
intellect also constitutes the actual intelligibility of our mind. Thomas’s
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claim, then, is that the agent intellect is capable of making sensible forms
actually intelligible only because it is itself essentially actually intelligible.
That the light of the agent intellect is in this way essentially actually in-
telligible, should not be surprising, given that this light is itself our par-
ticipating likeness in the uncreated light, which is essentially self-
cognizing. Indeed, it will emerge that the agent intellect can make sensible
forms actually intelligible only in virtue of its containing virtually, as a
participating likeness in the divine light, cognition of the divine being,
which as we saw, itself eminently contains the natures of possible created
things.
In examining Thomas’s account of the way the agent intellect makes
the forms of things actually intelligible we need to see how he distinguishes
two aspects to its activity:
Phantasms are illuminated by the agent intellect and, further, by its
power, species are abstracted from them. They are illuminated because,
in proportion as the sensible part is made more powerful by its con-
junction with the intellect, phantasms by the power of the agent intel-
lect are rendered apt to have intelligible intentions abstracted from
them. The agent intellect, moreover, abstracts species from phantasms,
in that by its power we can consider the specific natures without indi-
viduating conditions, according to whose likenesses the possible intel-
lect is informed. (ST Ia 85.1 ad 4)
The first aspect is the agent intellect’s illumining of phantasms. As we will
see, Aquinas says that this illumination is proportionate to the sensible part
of the soul being made “more powerful by its conjunction with the intel-
lect,” because he holds that the agent intellect augments the power of our
sense, so that it is capable of an induction which produces sensible appre-
hensions of the natures of material things. Through this heightened sensi-
ble power, which Thomas terms the particular reason, the agent intellect
illumines phantasms, insofar as it produces an ordering of phantasms which
captures the proper accidents of a material thing. The second aspect is the
agent intellect’s production, by abstraction from the illumined phantasms,
of an intelligible form in the possible intellect, a form through which the
possible intellect cognizes the quiddity of a material things.
But before discussing these two aspects of intellective abstraction, we
need to have before us a sketch of Thomas’s conception of human scientia.
For this conception forms the framework within which he develops his
account of both these aspects of intellective abstraction. Indeed, intellective
abstraction is itself the initial stage of an overall process whose end is the
production of human scientia. And the agent intellect functions as the
principal agent throughout this overall process only in virtue of its contain-
ing all scientia virtually in its light.
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I. Scientia and our Cognition of its First,
Immediate Principles28
On Thomas’s view, the power of spiritual light is most generally one which
generates cognition of the causes of things. The causes in question include
the formal, material, or final, as well as the efficient, so one should think of
a cause (causa) in the relevant sense as an explanatory factor. Moreover, the
end to which the power of spiritual light is directed is scientia—cognition of
the systematic and necessary explanatory relations in which things gener-
ally stand in virtue of their natures. Whereas God and the angels have such
cognition ab initio in acts of simple intellectual apprehension, we must use
our spiritual light to generate this cognition discursively—through reason-
ing, a process of comparing intentions to arrive at new intentions (DV
15.1c). Two types of reasoning, demonstrative and inductive, are both
indispensable to the process by which our spiritual light generates scienta:
whereas induction proceeds from sensed particulars to the cognition of
their universal natures, demonstration proceeds from universal intellectual
intentions to yield the cognition of the systematic explanatory interconnec-
tions among things which constitutes scientia in the proper sense.29
In Thomas’s account, demonstrative reasoning proceeds by way of
demonstrative syllogisms, in which a conclusion is drawn from two prem-
ises, each of which is better known than the conclusion (CPA I lec. 6, 17).
Through such syllogisms, we acquire scientia in the proper sense, by devel-
oping an understanding of the ways in which things, in virtue of their
natures, stand in a system of necessary interconnections.30 Demonstrative
reasoning presupposes cognition of principles which cannot themselves be
demonstrated, propositions whose truth must be self-evident to us. An
example of such a principle would be the proposition, ‘The whole is greater
than its part’ (CPA I lec. 5). Thomas terms these propositions the first,
immediate principles of our demonstrative reasoning, and thus of our
scientia. They are immediate because, being indemonstrable, they are not
28. The present section is heavily indebted to insightful discussions of Aqui-
nas’s conception of scientia by Stump (“Foundations of Knowledge,” III) and by
MacDonald (“Theory of Knowledge”).
29. See CPA I lec. 30. Scientia has as its subject matter the causes of things (CPA
I lec. 4, 13, 42). Because the reasoning through which we perfect scientia proceeds
through universal intentions (CPA I lec. 11, 16), properly, we have scientia only of
universals, not individuals (CPA I lec. 44).
30. MacDonald explains how, on Aquinas’s view, paradigmatic scientia (such as
geometry) is the product of explanatory demonstrations—demonstrations in which
the epistemically first principles are also metaphysically first principles—whereas
factual demonstrations yield nonparadigmatic scientia (such as theology) because
they do not capture explanations from metaphysically prior facts (“Theory of
Knowledge,” VI). Our scientia of the natures of material things, in particular, must
be non-paradigmatic, because we can cognize these natures only from their ef-
fects—that is, their sensible accidents (cf. I.iii, above).
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cognized in a demonstrative syllogism, through the intermediate term in
that syllogism, but are rather cognized solely through the terms which make
them up: this is the sense in which they are self-evident. These principles
are termed first, relative to the propositions which are cognized by demon-
stration from them (CPA I lec. 4, 7).
The first, immediate principles of scientia are of two kinds, common and
proper. A common first principle is so called because it is a first principle
common to all our scientia, as the law of non-contradiction is. Aquinas holds
that our cognition of these principles is innate. A proper first principle of
demonstration, in contrast, is a first principle proper to our scientia of some
determinate thing. These principles, such as the proposition that every man
is an animal, are propositions that explicate the real natures of things, by ex-
pressing the essential constituents of these natures. Like the common, the
proper principles are immediate; we cognize them merely through the uni-
versals which make up their terms. However, we cognize the universals that
make up the terms of proper principles only by abstracting them from our
sensible cognitions and thus only through induction over particulars—that
is, through the comparison of different material things as they are presented
to us in our sensible cognition (CPA I lec. 20, 30). Thus, insofar as we derive
our cognition of their terms from our sensible cognition, our cognition of
the proper principles is not innate in us. Our cognition of the common prin-
ciples, in contrast, derives solely from our participating likeness in the un-
created light, and thus does not depend on our sensible cognition in the way
our cognition of the proper principles does. The demonstration which yields
our scientia in the proper sense starts from proper sensibles (CPA I lec. 17), so
that our scientia depends on our cognition of the proper principles and thus
on the abstractive process which yields our cognition of the proper objects of
our intellect, the natures of material things.
II. Our Innate Cognition of the First Concepts of the
Understanding
Aquinas’s conception of the way our cognition of the common principles is
innate in us is crucial to his account of this intellect’s role, not only in
demonstration, but also in the induction and intellective abstraction which
yield our cognitions of the natures of determinate material things. For it
will emerge that the concepts which make up the terms of the common
principles, and which thus must also be innate in us, are innate in us in such
a way that they are implicit in the induction and abstraction which yield our
cognitions of the natures of determinate material things. These concepts,
which Thomas terms the first concepts of the understanding, include that
of being, “the first concept in our intellect” (CPA I lec. 5), as well as the
concepts of unity and truth. Thomas terms these concepts the first concepts
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of the understanding because, as we will see, he holds that all other univer-
sal principles derive from them, so that they are first relative to all other
universal principles. We cognize the first concepts of the understanding
immediately in the sense that we do not cognize them through anything
else—they are cognized per se, in the same way in which the proper and
common sensibles are cognized per se (ST Ia 87.1 ad 1).
Thomas holds that the common principles—“the first principles whose
cognition is innate in us”—are “certain likenesses of uncreated truth”:
The first principles whose cognition is innate [innatus] in us are certain
likenesses of uncreated truth.31 When we judge about other things
through these likenesses, we are said to judge things through un-
changeable principles or through uncreated truth. (DV 10.6 ad 6)
He holds, moreover, that these principles are evident to us through the light
of reason:
The light of reason through which such [inborn and self-evident first]
principles are evident to us is implanted in us by God as a kind of
reflected likeness in us of the uncreated truth. (DV 11.1c)
The common principles are likenesses of uncreated truths, because they are
truths about being, unity, and truth in general, and these transcendental
truths reflect the nature of God, who is himself being, unity, and truth. The
agent intellect’s being itself a reflected likeness in the divine act of under-
standing, explains how the common principles are themselves immediately
evident through its light. Indeed, it also explains how, in being evident
through the light of the agent intellect, the common principles are, none-
theless, self-evident; recall, in this connection, that the agent intellect itself,
insofar as it constitutes the actuality of all our intelligere, also constitutes the
mind’s actual intelligibility.
Now in claiming that cognition of the first common principles is innate
in us, Thomas is not claiming that we actually cognize these principles at
birth—even in first actuality. He is claiming, rather, that this cognition is
31. The force of Thomas’s characterization of these principles as “certain
likenesses of uncreated truth” is clarified by the following difficulty to which the
passage cited in the main text is a response:
Augustine says that our mind judges about bodily things through
non-bodily and eternal principles. But principles received from the
senses are not of this kind. Therefore, it seems that the human mind
does not receive cognition from sensible things. (DV 10.6 difficulty b)
The first principles in question, then, are likeness of uncreated truth in such a way
that they are not likenesses of material things. It follows that they are not the proper
first principles of our scientia. They must, rather, be the common principles.
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contained virtually in the light of the agent intellect. To see what this
containment amounts to, consider first his claim that the first concepts of
the understanding “pre-exist in us”:
Certain seeds of scientia pre-exist in us, namely the first concepts of the
understanding, which by the light of the agent intellect are immedi-
ately cognized through the species abstracted from sensible things.
These are either complex, as axioms, or simple, as the cognitions of
being, unity, and so on, which the intellect apprehends immediately.
From these universal principles, however, all principles follow, as from
certain seminal principles. When, therefore, the mind is led from these
universal cognitions to the actual cognition of the particular things,
which it cognized in potency, and as it were in the universal, then one
is said to acquire scientia.32 (DV 11.1)
As his characterizing the first concepts of the understanding as “seeds of
scientia” suggests, Aquinas holds that scientia proper grows out of our appli-
cation of these concepts in demonstrative reasoning. But our present con-
cern is primarily with the way these first concepts of the understanding
“pre-exist in us.” The pre-existence in question is virtual, that is, one in the
efficient cause whose operation brings about actual existence:
An effect, before it is actually produced, pre-exists virtually in its effi-
cient causes but not actually, which is to exist absolutely. In like manner,
before it is drawn out of demonstrative principles, the conclusion is
pre-cognized virtually, although not actually, in its self-evident princi-
ples. (CPA I lec. 3)
Now the efficient cause that actually produces the first concepts of the
understanding is the agent intellect; it does so in its act of intellective
abstraction. Our intellect immediately cognizes the first concepts “by the
light of the agent intellect” and “through the species abstracted from
sensible things.” Thomas’s position, then, is that the first concepts of the
understanding pre-exist virtually in the power of the agent intellect.
But what makes our cognition of the first concepts of the under-
standing, as well as the common principles which they make up, innate is
its pre-existing simply in the agent intellect, our power to understand.
Indeed, this cognition makes up the intrinsic principle of our power to
32. Thomas holds that the mind acquires scientia through demonstration.
Thus, the process described in the last sentence of this passage—that whereby the
mind is lead from the first concepts of the understanding to actual cognition of
particular things—is one that presupposes the products of intellective abstraction,
and not itself the process of intellective abstraction. Indeed, as the first sentence
makes clear, it is in intellective abstraction that the mind has immediate cognition
of these first concepts, in realizing them in its cognition of natures of material
things.
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understand. In Aquinas’s terminology, these concepts pre-exist as an “active
and completed” potency:
In natural things, something can pre-exist in potency in two ways. In
one, it is an active and completed potency, as when an intrinsic princi-
ple has sufficient power to flow into perfect act. Healing is an obvious
example of this, for the sick person is restored to health by the natural
power within him. The other appears in a passive potency, as happens
when the internal principle does not have sufficient power to bring it
into act. This is clear when air becomes fire, for this cannot result from
any power existing in the air. (DV 11.1)
Thomas holds that there are cases of active and completed potency which
require some external agency—for instance, the natural power of a patient
which requires medicine in order to restore the patient’s health, or a pupil’s
intellect which requires the aid of a teacher in order to produce the
conclusion from the premises in a piece of demonstrative reasoning (DV
11.1). Notice that the need for the external agent does not necessarily belie
the complete pre-existence of the effect in the internal agent.
That our cognition of common principles is “innate in us” in virtue of
its constituting the inner principle, or natural power, of our intellect be-
comes clear in the following passage, in which Thomas argues that, if our
cognition were not “complete through nature” with respect to these princi-
ples, our intellect would be unable to reduce itself from potency to act:
Because our intellect shares in a defective intellectual light, it is not
complete [completus] with regard to all the cognizables which it can
cognize naturally, but it is perfectible. Nor could it reduce itself from
potency to act had not its cognition with respect to some things been
complete through nature. Consequently, there necessarily are some
things in our intellects which we cognize naturally, namely, the first
principles—even though in us this cognition is not caused unless we
receive something through our senses. Therefore, the relation of our
intellect to those principles is similar to that which an angel has to all
that he cognizes naturally.33 (DV 8.15c)
That of which we have cognition which is complete through nature—be-
cause we cognize it simply by the light of our agent intellect—are the
universal conceptions of being, unity, and the like, and the common prin-
ciples which employ these conceptions as their terms. Whenever the intel-
lect reduces itself from potency, it does so by way of bringing these universal
conceptions, which are the intrinsic principles of its act of cognizing, into
33. Indeed, he holds that, were our intellectual lights stronger, in grasping first
principles we would at once see all that can be derived from them, as angels grasp
all that is contained in their innate species (ST Ia 58.3c, 4c).
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perfect act. When Aquinas says that it does so “through the species ab-
stracted from sensible things” (DV 11.1c), he is not claiming that the
cognition we actually have of the first concepts of the understanding de-
pends on our cognition of sensible things—for then we would not have this
cognition immediately through the light of the agent intellect. As we will
see in the next subsection, his point is rather that the intellect brings these
concepts, and thereby its own natural power, into perfect act only in ab-
stracting intelligible species from phantasms, an act which realizes these
concepts in these species.
The intellect also reduces itself from potency to act insofar as it em-
ploys the universal conceptions of being, unity, and truth in demonstrative
reasoning, which starts from the proper principles and employs common
principles to generate scientia proper. This point is implicit in Aquinas’s
claim that the light of the agent intellect is the principal cause of demon-
strative reasoning (DV 10.13), given his position that this intellect is what
constitutes our natural power to understand. It is explicit in the following
passage:
Just as the principal healing power is one’s inner nature, so that prin-
ciple which chiefly causes scientia is something intrinsic, namely the
light of the agent intellect, whereby scientia is caused in us, when we
descend through the application of universal [universalium] principles
to some special points [ad aliqua specialia], which we gain through
experience in discovery. (OSC 9 ad 7; cf. CDA II lec. 11)
In short, even after we come actually to cognize the first concepts of the
understanding by realizing them in cognition of the nature of some mate-
rial thing, they are still only seeds of scientia; they develop into scientia
proper, only in and through our subsequently applying them, as they con-
stitute common principles, to proper principles in demonstrations to gen-
erate scientia of particular sensible things.
We have seen in outline how our cognition both of the first common
principles and of the concepts that make up their terms, is innate in us: this
cognition pre-exists in the light of the agent intellect as our complete and
active potency to understand; it is cognition which is complete through
nature. Our cognition of the proper principles, including that of the na-
tures of material things which makes up their terms, is in contrast not
innate in us, because it pre-exists in the light of the agent intellect only in
partial active potency. In virtue of being in complete active potency in
respect of the first concepts of the understanding, the agent intellect is in
complete active potency in respect of that which is formal in the intelligible
species which it produces in the possible intellect. But it is only in partial
active potency in respect of these intelligible species, because in producing
these intelligible species it must derive that which is material in these
species from phantasms.
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III. Abstraction and the First Concepts of
the Understanding
I want now to focus on the agent intellect’s production of intelligible forms in
the possible intellect. As we saw, this is the second aspect of the process
through which the agent intellect makes sense-perceptible things actually in-
telligible. I will argue that the agent intellect produces these forms by supple-
menting our sensible apprehension of the proper accidents of a thing with
our innate cognitions of being and unity. It thereby brings these cognitions
“into perfect act” as that which is formal in the possible intellect’s cognition
of the nature of a material thing—namely, the cognition of substance as the
proper subject underlying and unifying sensible forms. Only through the
agent intellect’s supplying of this general cognition of being and unity do we
come to form intentions of material things which are formal likenesses of the
natures of things, intentions of the sort distinctive of the intellect. This for-
mal content is one which the agent intellect supplies through its nature as a
participating likeness in the uncreated light, the divine act of understanding.
Consider how Aquinas characterizes the agent intellect’s making forms
actually intelligible as its forming in itself likenesses of things:
This light of the agent intellect comes to the soul, as from its first
source, from separate substances and especially from God. Thus, it is
true that our mind receives scientiam from sensibles; nevertheless, the
soul forms in itself likenesses of things, inasmuch as through the light
of the agent intellect the forms abstracted from sensible things are
made actually intelligible so that they may be received in the possible
intellect. And in this way all scientia is in a certain way originally im-
planted in the light of our agent intellect, through the medium of
universal conceptions which are immediately cognized by the light of
the agent intellect. These serve as universal principles through which
we judge about other things, and in which we precognize these others.
In this respect, that opinion is true which holds that we previously had
in our cognition those things which we learn. (DV 10.6c)
Earlier in this reply, Aquinas rejects the view that “the soul itself, in the
presence of sensible things, forms in itself the likenesses of sensible things.”
He does so on the grounds that the activity of sensible things on our souls
does not merely lead us to recollect content which we already had, but
contributes their determinate likenesses to our intellect. But he denies only
that “the soul forms in itself the likenesses of all things.” In the passage
cited, St. Thomas is conceding that the soul does form in itself the like-
nesses of some things, and that it does so in making “the forms abstracted
from sensible things” actually intelligible. Moreover, it is insofar as the agent
intellect makes these forms actually intelligible by adding to them its uni-
versal conceptions of being and unity, conceptions that it produces from
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itself, that the agent intellect forms in itself likenesses of things. This is why
Aquinas explicitly ties the agent intellect’s ability to make forms actually
intelligible to all scientia being “originally implanted in” its light in the
medium of these universal conceptions.34
Aquinas also expresses his conception of the way in which the agent
intellect “forms in itself the likenesses of things” in producing intelligible
species by ascribing a hylomorphic composition to intelligible species:
The intelligible species has that which is formal in it, through which it
is actually intelligible, from the agent intellect, which is a higher power
than the possible intellect, although that which is material in it is
abstracted from phantasms. Therefore, more properly, the possible
intellect receives from what is higher than from what is lower, since that
which is from the lower can be received by the possible intellect only
in so far as it receives the form of intelligibility from the agent intellect.
(DV 18.8 ad 3)
What the agent intellect contributes to the actually intelligible species
independently of our sensible cognition, and which thus pre-exists in the
agent intellect as its “complete and active potency,” is “that which is formal”
in the intelligible species, “the form of intelligibility.” Moreover, Aquinas’s
remark that the intelligible species is actually intelligible through “that
which is formal” in it confirms that the agent intellect gives intelligible
species the form of intelligibility in bringing into perfect act the universal
conceptions of being and unity originally implanted in its light. For, as we
saw, this actual intelligibility is something that the agent intellect has insofar
as it constitutes the actuality of our intelligere, as our participated likeness in
the uncreated spiritual light. It is, thus, in producing from itself the univer-
sal conceptions that are “certain likenesses of uncreated truths,” that the
agent intellect gives intelligible species their form of intelligibility.
By implication, “that which is material in” the intelligible species is in
contrast its determinate likeness to a material thing. This point is explicit
in another passage that distinguishes the agent intellect’s and phantasms’
respective contributions in the production of intelligible species:
In the reception through which the possible intellect receives species
from phantasms, the phantasms act as instrumental and secondary
agents. The agent intellect acts as the principal and first agent. There-
fore, the effect of the action is received in the possible intellect accord-
ing to the condition of both, and not according to the condition of
either one alone. Therefore, the possible intellect receives forms whose
actual intelligibility is due to the power of the agent intellect, but whose
determinate likeness to things is due to cognition of the phantasms.
(DV 10.6 ad 7)
34. Compare also DV 11.1, discussed in Section III.ii.
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Notice, too, that intelligible species have their determinate likeness to
things due, not simply to phantasms, but to “cognition of the phantasms.”
This likeness derives from our sensible apprehension of the proper acci-
dents of things. As we saw in Section I.iii, the determinate likeness which
our intellectual intentions bear to things derives solely from our sensible
apprehension of their proper accidents. And, as we will now see, this
apprehension is itself the product of the first aspect of the agent intellect’s
activity in rendering phantasms actually intelligible—namely, its illumina-
tion of phantasms through the particular reason.35
IV. The Agent Intellect’s Illumination of Phantasms
Through the Particular Reason
The particular reason is an inner sense unique to humans. It does, however,
correspond to an inner sense in animals which Thomas dubs the estimative
power (vis aestimativa), and it will prove helpful to approach his account of
the particular reason by way of his account of the estimative power.
Aquinas posits an estimative power in animals on the grounds that they
seek or shun things, not merely because those things are pleasurable or
repugnant to their senses, but because they perceive that those things are
somehow harmful or repugnant to them. Such perceptions require that
these animals have intentions of the usefulness or harmfulness of things,
intentions that are neither received directly in sensation nor generated
through the common sense. The estimative power is simply the power by
which animals come to have these intentions. Sense memory, the fourth
inner sense, is the power animals have to retain those intentions.
35. It is instructive to contrast DV 10.6 ad 7 to a passage in the Summa Theologiae
that distinguishes the contribution which phantasms make to our cognition of the
natures of material things from that of the agent intellect generally. Having insisted
that phantasms cannot act directly and of itself on the possible intellect, Thomas
tells us that the phantasms cannot, then, be “the total and complete cause of
intellectual cognition—better to say it is somehow the material of the cause (materia
causae)” (ST Ia 84.6). Note, he does not say that phantasms are the material cause
of our knowledge, but ‘the material of the cause’—a curious phrase that, to my
knowledge, appears nowhere else in Thomas’s corpus. The import of this phrase, I
suggest, is that phantasms, as the particular intentions over which the particular
reason performs its induction, are what give rise to the determinate likeness which
intelligible species bear to material things: they thus do not act directly on the
possible intellect, but only provide the material of the actually intelligible species,
a species whose actual intelligibility, its capacity to inform the possible intellect is
due to the light of the agent intellect. I am proposing, then, that ST Ia 84.6 is
concerned with both aspects of the agent intellect’s activity in making sensible
things actually intelligible, whereas DV 10.6 ad 7, is concerned specifically with the
second aspect—that is, with its activity “in the reception through which the possible
intellect receives species from phantasms.”
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Like the estimative power, the particular reason produces intentions,
such as those of danger or utility, which are not of proper sensibles. However,
whereas the estimative power does so through natural instinct, the particular
reason does so through comparing the intentions that the other senses
produce through sensible forms. Indeed, Aquinas calls it the particular
reason, because it “compares individual intentions the way the reason com-
pares universal intentions” (ST Ia 78.3; cf. CDA II 6 [396]). Unlike its prop-
erly intellectual counterpart, it is of particulars, because, being “part of the
material order, it does not completely abstract from matter” (OPI sec. 425).
Nonetheless, it transcends the particular, insofar as it compares particulars
under universals, and can generate intentions of a particular thing “as exist-
ing in its common nature” (CDA II 6 [398]). And, Aquinas holds, the sense
part receives this heightened power by a “kind of overflow” from the intel-
lect, due its “propinquity to” the same (ST Ia 78.3 ad 5; cf. ST Ia 85.1 ad 3).
So Aquinas tells us that the particular reason has its “collative power” be-
cause of its “conjunction with the intellect—where is found the very reason
which treats of universals” (OPI sec. 425). Indeed, he holds that the particu-
lar reason is “said to be intellectual and rational, insofar as it participates
somehow in the reason, obeying and following its operation” (CDA III 5
[745]); thus, he says that “the agent intellect is related to the phantasms
which it illumines as an artisan is to the object it produces” (QDA 5).36
According to Aquinas, without the operation of the particular reason,
we would never understand anything (CDA III 5 [745]; cf. SCG II 80 [6]).
And in a passage which I have already discussed (in Section I.iii), he claims
that the particular reason’s sensing the universal, the nature in the particu-
lar, is a necessary condition of our intellect’s ever coming to have universal
cognition from our sensible cognition:
sensing is properly and per se of the singular, but yet there is somehow
even a sensing of the universal. For sense cognizes Callias not only so
far as he is Callias, but also as he is this man; and similarly, Socrates as
he is this man. As a result of such an attainment pre-existing in sense,
the intellectual soul can consider man in both. But if it were in the very
nature of things that sense could apprehend only that which pertains
to particularity, and along with this could in no wise apprehend the
nature in the particular, it would not be possible for universal cognition
to be caused in us from sense-apprehension. . . . Therefore, because we
receive cognition of universals from particulars, Aristotle concludes
that it is clear that one cognizes first universal principles by means of
induction, for in this way, namely by a process of induction, sense
perception produces the universal in the soul, insofar as all the particu-
lars are considered. (CPA II lec. 20)
36. I suggest that it is also in this extended sense that Aquinas ascribes to the
senses the capacity to judge (ST Ia 85.6). Compare Kretzmann’s interesting discus-
sion of this and related passages in sec. 5 of “Infallibility, Error, and Ignorance.”
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As we saw in Section I, Aquinas is not asserting that the particular reason
forms intentions that are formal likenesses of the natures of things. Indeed,
we are now in a position to see how this point is implicit in his characterizing
the sense’s cognizing of Socrates “as he is this man” as an attainment which
“pre-exists” in sense: our sensible apprehension of Socrates does not, itself,
constitute an actual cognition of Socrates as a man, but this cognition
pre-exists in this sensible apprehension virtually, insofar as this apprehen-
sion is a partial efficient cause, along with the agent intellect, of this
cognition’s coming actually to exist in the possible intellect.
That the sensible apprehension the particular reason effects is one of
the sensible accidents of things, insofar as they constitute the proper acci-
dents of a material thing, is also suggested by Aquinas’s description of the
particular reason’s function as that of ordering phantasms:
The reason orders phantasms in such a way as to make understanding
possible. Just as the different ordering of the same letters of the alpha-
bet produces different understandings, so too different conditions of
phantasms result in different intelligible species in the intellect. (ST IIb
173.2)
The analogy Thomas draws between the way different words (orderings of
letters of the alphabet) give rise to understandings, on the one hand, and
the way different orderings of phantasms give rise to different intelligible
species, confirms that phantasms do not contain the formal likenesses of
the natures of material things that the agent intellect produces in abstract-
ing actually intelligible species from phantasms. Moreover, it suggests that
the particular reason’s preparation of phantasms makes possible the agent
intellect’s production of actually intelligible species by producing an order-
ing of phantasms, which is a distinctive effect of the exercise of the nature
of a material thing. The intention in which phantasms are ordered as such
is, I suggest, what the particular reason’s sensing of a particular thing “as
existing in its common nature” consists in.
On Aquinas’s account, the agent intellect, through the particular rea-
son, compares different particular intentions to originate the sensible ap-
prehension of different material substances in respect of their proper
accidents, an apprehension from which we can in turn derive, in the
intellect, the universal rationes under which the particulars it compares are
to be subsumed in understanding those particulars.
One might object that this account is incoherent, because in order to
compare these particulars, the particular reason would already have to have
the universal rationes which the comparing was supposed to provide. How-
ever, in order to explain how the particular reason is capable of this com-
parison, we need suppose only that the cognition of natures which this
comparison puts us in a position to acquire pre-exists in general in the light
of the agent intellect, in partial active potency. For such pre-existence
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suffices to explain how this light can, through the particular reason, com-
pare our various experiences of sensible things to yield sensible apprehen-
sions of things in respect of their proper accidents. That this cognition
pre-exists only in this way explains how the comparison can be one in the
service of producing a universal intention that our intellect hitherto lacked.
Only through the operation of the agent intellect in particular reasoning,
in the activity of comparing itself, do we come to have a full, actual grasp of
the ratio under which the particular reason performs this comparison (CPA
I lec. 2). In short, not only our demonstrative reasoning, but also the
inductive reasoning through which we acquire our initial grasp of the
quiddities of material things, requires that the conclusion pre-exist, in
partial active potency, in the faculty of reasoning (CPA I lec. 1, 3). This
contention lies behind Thomas’s remark at DV 11.1 that all of scientia—and
thus also the proper principles on which our scientia of the natures of
material things depends—is implanted in the light of the agent intellect, in
the medium of the first concepts of the understanding.
The human spiritual light’s power, much as the angelic intellect’s, is
perfected by being delimited by a definite likeness it itself lacks, so as to
constitute the “power to achieve a specific and determinate effect” (ST Ia
67.4 ad 2).37 In the case of an angelic intellect, the definite likenesses its
spiritual light requires are innate intelligible species; the ability it has
through these species is the ability to form intellectual intentions, each of
which represents, in its unity, the proper and specific natures of many
things. In the case of the human intellect, the initial determinate likenesses
with which our spiritual light must be augmented in order to perform its
natural operation consist in the images of material things which we receive
in sensible cognition. The specific and determinate power to achieve an
effect that our spiritual light, given these images, comes to have is the
ability to produce sensible apprehensions of the natures of things through
the particular reason and then to inform the possible intellect with actually
intelligible forms which derive their determinate likeness to things from
these sensible apprehensions.
37. Thomas actually uses this phrase in describing the way in which the
physical light of the sun is perfected by being formed. The context is provided by
a knotty question of scriptural interpretation: if physical light is “an active quality
deriving from the substantial form of the sun,” how could God have created light
prior to created the sun, as in the Genesis account of creation? The reply:
The light mentioned [in the Genesis account of the first day of
creation] was the light of the sun, but the sun had not yet been formed,
in the sense that the substance of the sun already existed, having the
power of illumining in a general way, and then later acquired a special
and determinate power to produce particular effects. (Super ad Genesii)
This account of physical light, we shall see, parallels Aquinas’s account of spiritual
light.
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CONCLUSION
According to St. Thomas, the intelligible forms that come to inform our
intellects are not propagated to our souls through our senses. Indeed, they
are not present in any sensible cognition. They are, rather, forms produced
through our share in the divine spiritual light. This connatural light of our
souls produces these forms, in and through particular reasoning, in a
process which aims for the perfection, in scientia, of our natural potency to
cognize. Moreover, it is capable of doing so only because all scientia pre-
exists in it virtually and universally, in partial active potency. But, in order
for our intellect thus to reduce itself from potency to act, this light, being
dim, requires the phantasms provided by our sensible cognition. It requires
phantasms, not because they already contain what we represent abstractly
in concepts, but because, in supplying images of material things, phantasms
provide enough information to permit the agent intellect to render distinct
the content which pre-exists in its light in a “general and confused way.” In
this way, Aquinas maintains that we derive our intelligible species from our
sense cognition without holding that these species “come in” from outside
us in this cognition.
ABBREVIATIONS
CBDT 5 Aquinas’s Commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate
CDA 5 Aquinas’s Commentary on the De Anima
CM 5 Aquinas’s Commentary on the Metaphysics
CPA 5 Aquinas’s Commentary on the Posterior Analytics
DA 5 Aristotle’s De Anima
DPD 5 Aquinas’s De Potentia Dei
DV 5 Aquinas’s De Veritate
OGA 5 Aristotle’s On the Generation of Animals
OPI 5 Aquinas’s On the Principle of Individuation
OSC 5 Aquinas’s On Spiritual Creatures
OUIAA5 Aquinas’s On the Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists
OVG 5 Aquinas’s On the Virtues in General
PA 5 Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics
QDA 5 Aquinas’s Questiones de Anima
SCG 5 Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles
ST 5 Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae
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